INTRODUCTION
In the decades following the abolition of indenture, Indians overseas and their representatives constantly asserted the legitimacy of Indians as proficient settlers, especially through their contributions through labour and in expanding the frontiers of the empire. The claim to be a proficient settler went hand in hand with the assertion that settler-citizens should have the right to settle across the British Empire. Existing literature outlines how settler colonial governments administered foreign “races” and indigenous “tribes” with their own separate legal systems and frames Indians overseas as contesting post-indenture citizenship ambiguities by claiming belonging as British subjects (Mamdani, 2012). Efforts to reform empire reflected the understanding that a perfect system of British subjecthood would include all races equally. The claim to imperial citizenship which I highlight differs from the critique of non-inclusive empire as “Un-British” (Banerjee, 2005). I will unravel the notion of belonging within empire, which, like white settler colonialism, distanced itself from and claimed supremacy over the “indigenous” by articulating how it aspired to be a colonizer. I explore how Indians overseas and the Government of India took ownership of efforts to characterize them as a foreign element by asserting rights to freedom to be a settler wherever they chose and under conditions that were suitable to them. As opposed to contesting the idea that they were a foreign element, they made claims to equal citizenship with whites by highlighting their proximity to European subjects through proficiency as colonizers.
Specifically, I look at how the Government of India and Indians overseas made these claims in their responses to proposals for Indian Colonization Schemes. None of the Colonization schemes I discuss in this paper ever materialized. The main reasons behind their failure to materialize were also the main arguments that the Government of India and Indians overseas made against the colonization schemes. The first argument against the schemes were that they were destabilizing to an Indian claim to the full rights of imperial citizenship within empire, as they were offered as a bargaining chip in exchange for India giving up the claim to mobility within empire. The second major argument against Indian Colonization Schemes was that they would do nothing to fix the problem of India within empire, and that the primary focus for all Indians both inside and outside the physical borders of the subcontinent, should be the status and interests of India within empire first, and of its diaspora second.

‘A COLONY FOR INDIA’ IN TANGANYIKA

During the Imperial War Cabinet of 1918, Theodore Morison’s speech, entitled “A Colony for India” was circulated for consideration. Theodore Morison was at the time Senior Political Officer in the new Mandated territory of Tanganyika, formerly German East Africa, and former principal at Aligarh College. His proposal, which never materialized, was a response to India’s claim to equal status with the Dominions during the Imperial War Cabinet in 1918. Like Canada, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand, India pushed for the rights for the right of Indians to access land to provide an outlet for Indian overseas settlement; the unrestricted right of Indians to move between and settle in the colonies and Dominions; the recognition that India was a “civilized” nation within Empire and that Indians overseas were proficient settlers and “civilizers”; and Indian self-determination during the Imperial War Cabinet of 1917, and even later during the Imperial Conference of 1921. In both conferences, the concept of Imperial
Reciprocity, the idea that all members of empire should benefit equally off from it, underlay India’s demands. Morison offered India a colony as an outlet for Indian colonization and emigration in exchange for India giving up its rights to free movement and settlement in the Dominions and across the empire. Morison admitted that India giving up it’s claim to free movement in the empire was a huge renunciation, but that the benefits of having such a colony allocated to Indian usage would adequately compensate for this. Morison argued that if Tanganyika came under the jurisdiction of the Government of India, as with other Dominions in the Commonwealth, India must have “freedom in directing the policy to be pursued in her colony,” the right to control immigration, and the right to “exclude from her territory…immigrants from other parts of the Commonwealth”(Morison, 1918).

Morison also made the case for why such an arrangement would be necessary and beneficial for the British empire. He pointed to the numerous deaths of white men during the First World War, emphasizing how this created a need for a reserve of colonizers, including administrators, agriculturalists, doctors, merchants, and others to help develop and obtain control over the parts of the empire that white men are having trouble keeping control of. Morison bought into an idea which was prevalent at the time and well-circulated amongst his contemporaries, which is that India contained “reservoirs of manhood” that were “almost inexhaustible.” He suggested that Medical colleges in Bombay, Calcutta, and Lucknow could supply much needed doctors to the colony, thus providing care to natives in Tanganyika that would meet, if not surpass the service formerly provided by missionaries (Morison, 1918). According to him, India would be able to fill all the necessary positions required to administer, settle, organize, and police Tanganyika if it became an Indian colony.
When it came to the effect this would have on Africans in Tanganyika, Morison was confident that India would decide where in the colony to settle Indians after taking “due regard to native interests.” He encouraged, especially, the virtual transplant of village India to Tanganyika, as in his view, these emigrants, “self-sufficient in their little village communities, would be genuine pioneers and colonists” because they would have the ability to turn Tanganyika into a colony that would serve as an exporter of the surplus food it produced, in the same way that India served the empire. He argued that white planters had failed to systematically develop Tanganyika into a productive food-producing region, and that Indian villager emigrants might even prove to contribute more to this project than white planters. Morison also pointed to efficient methods of cattle care in India as a factor that would help foster an appreciation, among Africans of the “beneficience of his new governors” from India. Morison believed that the “influence of India would be more beneficial to the native than that of Europe.” He alluded to notions of civilizational hierarchy prevalent in the interwar period, to argue that unlike white civilization, which he argued attained its ends “by very complicated processes which are entirely above the native’s comprehension,” agricultural practices like ploughing, weaving, and well-sinking, “as performed by an Indian peasant” were processes which Africans “could comprehend and adapt.” Morison argued that “Indian immigration would not in itself suffice to produce results beneficial to the native,” but he was confident that an Indian administration in Tanganyika would recognise that the pre-occupation and duty of a colonial administration was first and foremost “the welfare and elevation of the indigenous races.” Most strikingly, Morison framed the creation of a colony for India as an opportunity for India to “share in the white man’s burden” (Morison, 1918).
The feedback on Theodore Morison’s proposal from Indians in South Africa was frigid. *Indian Opinion* pointed out that Morison considered Tanganyika ideal for Indian settlers only because it was unsuited to white settlement. They considered the scheme as a bribe for India to continue feel a sense of “self-respect and pride” for belonging in the empire. *Indian Opinion* also pointed out that the territory was still not yet officially won from Germany, and that what would happen to the territory would still be subject to peace negotiations. In addition, the paper was against the proposal because of ambiguity surrounding how accepting Morison’s colonization scheme would affect Indians already domiciled in the Dominions. Predictably, being settled in a Dominion themselves, the editors of Indian Opinion were against the scheme because it would give up Indian rights to settle in South Africa. They also argued that having such a colony would not address any of the grievances held by Indians, wherever it is they were settled across the British Empire. They asked whether an Indian settled in Canada or some other part of the British Empire would “feel any satisfaction in the knowledge that other Indians would enjoy absolute freedom in East Africa?” They argued that the proposed scheme only benefitted those “who may be dissatisfied with the state of affairs in their Motherland,” offering them a place where they “may go and flourish under new conditions,” but that this did nothing to settle the Imperial question or to put to rest the question of the “just and equal treatment of Indians resident [in all parts of the] Dominions.” The article eventually declared that so long as India was in the position of a dependency, such offers could only be regarded with suspicion, and that India only wanted “fair and equal treatment in the eye of the law wherever the British flag flies,” and that this was a birthright Indians would not barter away. (‘A Bribe or a Bargain?’, 1918). *Indian Views*, another popular Indian newspaper based in Durban published excerpts from Morison’s interview with the *Natal Witness*, in which Morison framed the scheme as an option that offered both Indians and
Europeans to maintain separate spaces where neither had to “lose their national characteristics,” and without “debarring India from expansion within the Empire” (‘East Africa for India: A Proposition to the Union’, 1918).

The Aga Khan at the time, an imperial loyalist, was among those who supported Morison’s scheme (Brennan, 2012). Leaders of the East African Indian Congress in Nairobi led the regional campaign in support of the scheme by petitioning for it, and Dar es Salaam’s Indian Association also lobbied Gandhi for support for the scheme. As Sana Aiyar points out, when it came to Indian subimperialism, when British subjects benefitted from the spread of imperial rule across the Indian Ocean, they tended not to be critical of the colonial project, rather, they wanted to ensure that they could continue to benefit from it (Aiyar, 2015) Leaders of the East African Indian National Congress organized a deputation to India to present the case for Indian colonization to nationalists in 1919, but the scheme was rejected (Aiyar, 2015; Brennan, 2012). In response to Indian support for the scheme, African elders in Tanganyika organized a counter-protests and petitioned against the scheme to civil administrator Horace Byatt, declaring that they would rather be subjects under British direct rule, though by 1921, the plan for Indian colonization in Tanganyika had been closed (Brennan, 2012).

AN APPEAL FROM BRITISH GUIANA FOR INDIAN COLONIZATION

A few years later, immediately following the abolition of indenture, Indian colonization also represented an avenue for legitimizing the Indian aspirational claim to British Imperial citizenship. The enquiry into an Indian colonization scheme to British Guiana from 1919 to 1926 encapsulates the assumption that the best place for the less respectable Indian abroad was at “home” in India, and that improving India’s claim to imperial citizenship would only occur when it could be confirmed that Indians travelling overseas were only doing so as settlers and
civilizers, not as “coolies.” The notion that the best place for Indians overseas was at home, and that the concerns of Indians overseas should come secondary to the concern over the position of India within the empire was prevalent in the early twentieth century, and was tied up with a social disdain for indentured workers, gained some political capital in the 1920s, as well as towards the end of the 1940s, as ideas of empire and imperial citizenship waned towards the end of the 1940s (Hofmeyr, 2013). However, in the 1920s, the notion of a Greater India, which included colonial-born emigrants and Indians overseas became recognized coinage (Bayly, 2004; Hofmeyr, 2013).

In 1916, the Government of India informed the Government of British Guiana that indentured immigration would cease immediately, and in 1919, a General Colonization Committee was formed in British Guiana with sub-committees appointed to represent all interests and races to consider a scheme for future immigration into the colony. After a compiled report of these sub-committees was submitted to Britain, two Indian delegates from the General Colonization Committee, Dr. Wharton and Joseph Alexander Luckhoo, proceeded to India as delegates with a summary of the scheme, which was drawn up by Joseph Nunan, the Chairman of the British Guiana Delegation (Pillai, Tivary, & Keatinge, 1924). Luckhoo, planters, and middle class Indians in British Guiana saw the country as a resource rich but “undeveloped and unexploited” colony, and requested that Indians from India who they saw as the ideal subimperialist colonizers, to receive assistance emigrating the colony as settlers (Seecharan, 2011). What remained absent in different iterations of the proposed scheme was the impact it would have on the descendants of emancipated Africans in Guiana (Seecharan, 2011).

An Indian deputation to Guiana followed Luckhoo and Wharton’s first deputation. Members of the Indian deputation published a series of reports assessing the scheme. All reports
expressed interest in the scheme, but detailed improvements that would be required if the scheme were to be put in place. PK Pillai and VN Tivary’s report concluded that poor health conditions in British Guiana posed too high of a risk for a colonization scheme to be safe for Indians and India would not favour implementation of such a scheme until 1930, as the immediate resumption of emigration from India for the purpose of unskilled labour would inhibit efforts that were in progress to put an end to indentured emigration (Pillai et al., 1924). Kunwar Maharaj Singh’s report highlighted that Indian intellectuals in British Guiana were opposed to any purely labour oriented labour scheme, but were unanimous in their support of further immigration because they wished to maintain cultural and political connections with India to prevent Indian “absorption” into other races and their potential “denationalisation” and to increase Indian numbers in the colony in order to secure influence there (Singh, 1925). Ultimately, he proposed that the Indian colonization scheme proposed by Joseph Nunan should be accepted. GN Keatinge’s report concluded that a colonization scheme of families of labourers as well as agriculturalists was needed to relieve congested parts of India, especially since the colony would offer higher standards of living than that which was available for these groups in India, but that any scheme would require substantial assistance for the emigrant colonists from the Government of British Guiana (Pillai et al., 1924). All of the Indian deputation reports recommended to go through with the colonization scheme, though not immediately, and with certain condition, and proposed that colonist emigrants should have access to assistance with repatriation if needed. They also emphasized the necessity that no distinction be made between the different races in the colony (explicitly, in deliberate contrast to South Africa). Finally, they all proposed the appointment of official representation of India in British Guiana that would watch over the interests of Indian settlers.
The scheme, as proposed to the Government of India would give emigrants the choice of a land grant or a position working on sugar estates for three years. However, there were some misunderstandings when the Indian delegates met to discuss the scheme with planters in British Guiana. It did not help Indo-Guyanese case for the scheme that planters strongly supported it. Planters insisted, upon their meeting with Singh, that they wanted to avoid overweighting the land settlement option and preferred the labour option (Singh, 1925). Resistance to the scheme within British Guiana came from both Indian and African labouring classes. Pillai and Tivary’s report noted the discrepancy between the British Guiana East Indian Association’s desire to bring settlers from India and the concern of both African and Indian workers in Guiana that fresh immigration would come at their expense, pushing wages down, and their objection to concessions being offered to newcomers which would not be offered to themselves (Pillai et al., 1924).

In the end, after two deputations from British Guiana to India and a deputation from India to British Guiana, the scheme was rejected in 1926. From the outset, at the first deputation from British Guiana to India headed by Nunan, Wharton, and Luckhoo, suspicion surrounding the scheme surfaced at any discussion of the details, especially with the campaign for the abolition of indenture still fresh on the mind of Indian public opinion. The campaign for the abolition of indenture had mobilized massive popular indignation for emigration for the purpose of unskilled work. Fears that the scheme was only a labour scheme little different from indenture, that it would compromise the “morality” of emigrant Indian women, and that the abrogation of Indian political rights would continue surfaced in all discussions of the scheme (Seecharan, 2011).

Clem Seecharan details how ambivalence towards the proposed scheme were guided by a revised conception of India’s relationship to empire after World War I, which was that the
empire was so irrevocably tainted by white supremacy that Indians could not contribute anything of substance while abroad. Incidents that shook faith in the idea that empire was invested in protecting Indians both at home and abroad, such as the Jallianwallah Bagh massacre in 1919; the suppression of a massive strike in Fiji by Indo-Fijian sugar workers in 1920; and South Africa’s refusal to recognise India as a forthcoming Dominion whose subjects deserved equal treatment with other Dominion subjects at the Imperial War Conference in 1917 and the Imperial Conference in 1921 discouraged the Government of India from entertaining requests for assistance to send Indians abroad as settlers, be they labourers or agriculturalists (Seecharan, 2011). Sana Aiyar points out that the Jallianwallah Bagh massacre was central to the Government of India refusing to move forward with the EAINC deputation’s request to move forward with Morison’s scheme (Aiyar, 2015).

In the case of the British Guiana scheme in 1919, Indo-Guyanese architects of the scheme saw it as a remedy for the “resilient coolie stain” that the experience of indenture left on Indians in Guyana. By appealing to India to send those they saw as fellow nationals to be colonizers as opposed to “coolies,” they hoped to distance themselves from being simply a cog ancillary to the plantation. Although the Government of India decided to reject the scheme, their initial cooperation with enquiry into the scheme reveals a desire to investigate British Guiana as an outlet for Indian emigration. Singh’s report on the scheme praised British Guiana as a place where India’s “humblest classes” can go, work, and attain a higher standard of living than they ever would have been able to attain in India. Even when he recognized that emigration to British Guiana had not benefitted all Indians there, he argued in his report that poverty was in general not so patent there as it was in India (Singh, 1925). Singh supported the idea of a colonization scheme because it would ensure that the coolie who left India would be given the opportunity to
escape that state of being a coolie. I would argue that the rejection of the scheme was largely because, like Morison’s proposed scheme, as it stood, it did not appear that the conditions in British Guiana would serve as an outlet for respectable, free, Indian settlement abroad.

**INDIAN COLONIZATION: AN ALTERNATIVE TO REPATRIATION**

In 1932, the provisions of the Indian Relief Act, the agreement Gandhi had made with Smuts and the most well-known outcome of his Satyagraha campaigns in South Africa, had gone through two renegotiations. The product of this first set of negotiations was the Cape Town Agreement of 1927, outlined a scheme of Assisted Emigration, a euphemistic title for an incentivized repatriation program to reduce the Indian population in the Union of South Africa, while declaring a commitment to “uplift” those Indians who decided to stay in the Dominion (U. Mesthrie, 1985). In 1932, after finding that the numbers of Indians taking advantage of the bonus and free passage to India had virtually ceased, the Government of the Union of South Africa called for a renegotiation of the Cape Town Agreement to brainstorm further strategies to reduce the Indian population in the Union. The delegates to the conference agreed to set up an Indian Colonization Enquiry Committee to investigate the possibility of creating a colony for Indians in British Guiana, North Borneo, or New Guinea (‘Proceedings of Conference between the representatives of the Government of India and the Government of the Union of South Africa, Cape Town’, 1932).

As with the proposals and investigations into schemes of Indian colonization of Tanganyika and British Guiana, the 1932 scheme also never materialized. The Indian Colonization Enquiry Committee (ICEC) aimed to “explore the possibilities of a scheme of colonization in which Indians from South Africa might participate” in the hopes that the opportunities that would be “created for the establishment, in some other country than India or
South Africa, of an Indian community free to develop along the lines of its natural aspirations, would appeal to a large section of the Indian population of the Union” (‘Indian Colonization Scheme. Statement made by the Honourable Minister of the Interior in the House of Assembly on the 15th June, 1933’, 1933). Once the proposal for the enquiry committee went public, the South African Indian Congress (SAIC) held an Emergency Conference on August 27th and 28th 1932 for the express purpose of reviewing the situation and to discuss the question of participating with the enquiry committee. The SAIC decided to cooperate with the ICEC on the grounds that it would be inspired by patriotic motives, and adhered to its “mission to explore outlets for colonization for the increasing population of India and at the same time to ascertain whether there exist any good opportunities for the South African Indians in the countries explored”; that the SAIC’s cooperation would not be deemed to mean that Indians in the Union of South Africa would be undesirables or that the Indian population was meant to be reduced; and that, though they may be prepared to cooperate in exploring the possibilities of a colonization scheme, they would be free to act as they deemed necessary in the interests of the Indian community (‘Telegram from Quyamans to Polindia, Pietermaritzburg’, 1933).

The ICEC interviewed Kunwar Maharaj Singh, then Agent of the Government of India in the Union, for his opinion on the feasibility of a colonization scheme as well as viable options for potential areas that the committee could enquire into. In 1925, he had published a report on his deputation to British Guiana in 1921 to investigate the feasibility of Indian colonization there. After his involvement with the first enquiry into Indian Colonization to British Guiana, Singh had also enquired into the condition of Indians settled in Trinidad and Mauritius. Singh’s general conclusion was that he knew of no countries in which colonization from India would be practicable, largely due to the world-wide depression and financial conditions (‘Proceedings
called and states. (Proceedings resumed at New Government Buildings, 11am, 9th December, 1933. Kunwar Maharaj Singh. Called and States., n.d.). He also insisted that the condition of Indians in British Guiana was an improvement in comparison with those in India, but that conditions for Indians were still better in Natal. When asked how Colonial-born Indians from South Africa would fit within the scheme to British Guiana, Singh advised that they would find it difficult in British Guiana, and would have more difficulty adjusting than Indians from India because they were used to a higher standard of living and were more westernized. MP George Heaton Nicholls outlined how, for a colonization scheme in which railways and “all the paraphernalia of modern industrial life” were provided, South African Indians would be needed as “guides,” to other Indian colonists as, in his opinion, they had “graduated so in the scale of colonization.” Singh replied to this suggestion with doubts that there was any large number of South African Indians who would be willing to undertake such a role (‘Proceedings resumed at New Government Buildings, 11am, 9th December, 1933. Kunwar Maharaj Singh. Called and States.’, n.d.).

Reactions to the proposed scheme from the Indian community in South Africa was polarizing. In response to the scheme, the Natal Indian Congress, which was a constituent body of the South African Indian Congress, split into two separate organizations, with the Natal Indian Congress being willing to cooperate with the Indian Colonization Enquiry Commission, and the breakaway group, the Colonial Born and Settlers Indian Association (CBSIA), seeing any form of cooperation with the enquiry commission as an affront to their right as British subjects to settle in the Union (Bhana, 1997; Cheddie, 1992; U. S. Mesthrie, 1987). The CBSIA’s manifesto asserted the indisputable rights of Indians born in South Africa and who had made South Africa their permanent home to remain in the country, and the very first point of the manifesto stated that it “strenuously opposes any scheme which has for its object the sending away of Indians”
from South Africa. (‘The Colonial Born and Settlers Indian Association Manifesto, Constitution, and Rules’, 1933) It explicitly opposed the Colonization Scheme and the Assisted Emigration Scheme and declared that it would “fight for the deletion” of these two schemes. (‘The Colonial Born and Settlers Indian Association Manifesto, Constitution, and Rules’, 1933) On August 26, 1933, the CBSIA held a mass meeting to protest against participation in the Indian Colonization Enquiry Committee (Cheddie, 1992). They were especially opposed to the Indian Delegation’s requirement that Indians in South Africa cooperate with the ICEC, and that the Indian Delegation did not consult South African Indians before agreeing to the terms of the Cape Town Agreement revisions of 1932, which provided for the creation of an enquiry committee (‘Colonial Born and Settlers’ Indian Association. First Natal Provincial Conference’, 1933).

When Sir Kurma Reddi, former Agent of the Government of India in the Union, was consulted regarding the scheme, he advised against a scheme to any of the destinations, stating that India could not be consented to “allow the lot of her people to be cast amidst savages” as India claimed “a very high standard of civilization” (‘Summary of Views expressed by public men in India on the Colonisation Enquiry Committee’s Report’, 1934). Similarly, a letter from Viceroy and Governor General Willingdon to the Governor General of South Africa warns that Indian Opinion would be against a colonization scheme to North Borneo because of the “prevailing impression” among them “regarding the savage character of some of its aboriginal inhabitants” (‘Correspondence From Willingdon, Viceroy and Governor-General of India, to the Early of Clarendon, Governor General of South Africa’, 1934). In the Indian Council of State debates, Sir Prakash Narain Sapru raised concern over New Guinea being considered as a potential destination of Indian colonization because in his view, the “indigenous people of New Guinea have remained in a state of semi-savagery” (‘Extract from the Council of State Debates,
On January 9, 1934, the SAIC submitted a statement of their position to the ICEC. It concluded that it had no interest in any Colonization Scheme except in so far as it may affect South African Indians. They also emphasized that Indians born in South Africa were “accustomed to the climatic conditions of South Africa,” and that the tropical climates of the intended destinations of Indian colonization would “have the same disadvantages for them as for a European South African” (Jhavery, Kajee, & Patel, 1934). The SAIC statement admitted that the Indian Community in the Union warranted the assumption that any such scheme of colonization would be intended merely to reduce the numbers of the Indian population, especially “to get rid of those who would have never been [in the Union] but for the insistent demands of the European population and without whom Natal could hardly have attained its present state of development and prosperity,” referring specifically to the scheme’s efforts to target the colonial born descendants of indentured workers. (Jhavery et al., 1934) They went on to explain that even if they set aside this much warranted suspicion, the scheme was still unattractive to South African Indians. The first reason was that the scheme was essentially a land settlement scheme, but they claimed that most emigrants from India emigrated in the capacity of agriculturalists employed on plantations or traders, and that none of the areas suggested for the scheme were fruitful for neither of these activities. New Guinea was ruled out as an option...
because it still remained under the trusteeship of Australia as a mandated territory, North Borneo and British Guiana were determined to be unsatisfactory in respect to health conditions and climate. British Guiana was also seen as unfeasible because it was too far away from India for the formation of a and fostering of an Indian merchant community there to be feasible.\(^1\) One of the most striking arguments the SAIC made against the scheme was the claim that South African Indians had “become accustomed to Western ideas and Western standards of life,” and that a colony for Indians from India would be founded upon “different standards,” therefore being unsuitable for South African Indian emigration.\(^2\) The SAIC asserted that it would be “difficult to see how Indians at present in South Africa could ever fit into such a Colony; our habits of mind, our habits of dress, and our general outlook are all different.”(Jhavery et al., 1934) In addition, they expressed serious doubt whether any country in the world would welcome a large influx of colonists, referring to the global economic depression and high unemployment experienced in all colonies, and that it was the “worst possible time to consider and examine the possibilities of colonization on a large scale” (Jhavery et al., 1934).

**SETTLER CITIZENSHIP AND INDIGENEITY**

Like the Morison’s call for “A Colony for India” in Tanganyika and the Luckhoo and Nunan deputation from British Guiana, the proposal for the formation of a colony for Indians in South Africa in either North Borneo, New Guinea, or British Guiana never materialized. A threat that runs through all the schemes discussed in this paper are that the reason for the rejection never lay in a critique of colonization. Instead, their failure lay in doubts as to the benefits of the formation of such a colony to Indians overseas or to the advancement of India’s position within

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\(^1\) (Jhavery, Kajee, & Patel, 1934) Also see Prakash Narain Sapru in (‘Extract from the Council of State Debates, Vol. II, No. 2’, 1934)

\(^2\) (Jhavery et al., 1934) P. 14.
the empire, especially as it related to India’s move towards Dominion status during the interwar period. In addition, in many cases, the schemes were rejected, by Indians overseas, Indian nationalists, or the Government of India because they were not convinced that proposals for the colony itself provided ideal or profitable conditions for Indian colonists. In the case of the Morison’s “Colony for India,” the indigenous person features as a figure who enables the position of settler for the Indian emigrant, through whom Indian emigrants can realize the full privileges of British imperial citizenship, through trusteeship and tutelage. In the case of the South ICEC, the presence of indigenous people was considered an obstruction to the smooth transition to the formation of an Indian settler colony. In the case of the British Guiana colonization scheme, the absence of discussion of indigenous people from the scheme and how the colonization scheme would affect the descendants of emancipated Africans in the colony.
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